Panel discussion: inflation targeting by Ben S. Bernanke et al.
A case can be made, I believe, that when the
economy is operating in the region of price stability,
public expectations and beliefs about the central
bank’s plans and objectives, always important,
become even more so. First, because the public
can no longer safely assume that the central bank
prefers lower to higher inflation, expectations
about future policy actions and future inflation
may become highly sensitive to what the public
perceives to be the Fed’s “just right” level of inflation.
Uncertainty about this “just right” level of inflation
thus may translate, in turn, into broader economic
and financial uncertainty. Second, at very low infla-
tion rates, the zero lower bound on the policy inter-
est rate is more likely to become relevant, which
increases the potential importance of effective expec-
tations management by monetary policymakers.
For example, when interest rates are very low, the
best way to ease policy may be to explain to the
public that the current low interest rate will be main-
tained for a longer period, rather than simply lower-
ing the current rate. It seems to me that the enhanced
importance of public beliefs and expectations about
monetary policy in the region of price stability
argues for greater attention by the central bank to
its methods of communication when inflation is low.
On the premise that effective communication
is even more crucial near price stability, I will focus
today on how an incremental move toward inflation
targeting, in the form of the announcement of a long-
run inflation objective, might help the Fed commu-
nicate better and perhaps improve policy decisions
as well, without the costs feared by those concerned
about a potential loss of flexibility. As usual, my
views are not to be attributed to my colleagues on
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System or the Federal Open Market Committee.
As a preliminary, I need to introduce the idea
of the optimal long-run inflation rate, or OLIR for





hould the Federal Reserve announce a quanti-
tative inflation objective? Those opposed to
the idea have noted, correctly, that the Fed
has built strong credibility as an inflation-fighter
without taking that step and that this credibility has
allowed the Fed to be relatively flexible in respond-
ing to short-run disturbances to output and employ-
ment without destabilizing inflation expectations.
So, the opponents argue, why reduce this flexibility
unnecessarily by announcing an explicit target for
inflation?
It would be foolish to deny that the Fed has
been quite successful on the whole over the past
two decades. Whether the U.S. central bank would
have been even more successful, had it announced
an explicit objective for inflation at some point, is
impossible to say. We just don’t know. We can’t re-
run history; and although empirical cross-country
comparisons can be useful, they are far from being
controlled experiments.
However, the relevant question at this point is not
the unknowable outcome of the historical counter-
factual but whether, given the initial conditions we
face today, the adoption of an explicit inflation
objective might not improve U.S. monetary policy
in the future. The Fed’s environment today is differ-
ent from that of the 1980s and 1990s in at least one
important respect: Price stability is no longer just
over the horizon, but has been achieved—core infla-
tion rates are currently not much above 1 percent.
Thus, in contrast to the experience of the past 35
years or so, in which there could be little doubt about
the Fed’s desired direction for inflation, today the
risks to inflation are more nearly symmetrical; that
is, inflation can be too low as well as too high. 
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The OLIR is the long-run (or steady-state) inflation
rate that achieves the best average economic per-
formance over time with respect to both the inflation
and output objectives. 
Note that the OLIR is the relevant concept for
dual-mandate central banks, like the Federal Reserve.
Thus, it is not necessarily equivalent to literal price
stability or zero inflation adjusted for the usual
measurement error bias. Rather, under a dual man-
date, a strong case can be made that, below a certain
inflation rate, the benefits of reduced microeconomic
distortions gained from price stability are outweighed
by the costs of too-frequent encounters of the funds
rate with the zero-lower-bound on nominal interest
rates. (This argument underlies the common view
that there should be a “buffer zone” against defla-
tion.) Hence, in general, the OLIR will be greater
than zero inflation, correctly measured. Note also
that the OLIR is an average long-run rate; variation
of actual inflation around the OLIR over the business
cycle would be expected and acceptable (Meyer,
2004).
What is the OLIR for the U.S. economy? A fairly
extensive recent literature has attempted to quantify
the OLIR. (See, e.g., Coenen, Orphanides, and
Wieland, 2003, and references therein.) Because
direct measures of the benefits of low inflation are
not available, papers in this literature, in practice,
estimate the OLIR to be the lowest inflation rate for
which the risk of the funds rate hitting the lower
bound appears to be “acceptably small.” Interestingly,
the results using this approach seem fairly consistent
across models and specifications, with several papers
(including work using FRBUS, the Federal Reserve’s
large econometric model of the U.S. economy; see
Reifschneider and Williams, 2000) having concluded
that the risk of hitting the zero bound seems to
decline sharply once the long-run average inflation
rate rises to about 2 percent. In addition, other
studies of the costs of very low inflation (such as
the supposed effects of downward nominal wage
rigidity on the allocation of labor) have found that
these costs are also largely eliminated at inflation
rates of about 2 percent (Akerlof, Dickens, and Perry,
1996; see also Altig, 2003). 
Fortuitously, then, it may be the case that some-
thing in the vicinity of 2 percent is the optimal long-
run average inflation rate for a variety of assumptions
about the costs of inflation, the structure of the
economy, the distribution of shocks, etc. However,
before we embrace that number, many details
remain to be filled in. For example, in practice, much
might depend on the specification of the inflation
index, on assumptions made about the steady-state
value of the real interest rate, and on other factors.
Also important would be getting a better sense of
the range of uncertainty around this number. More
research on this issue would be highly worthwhile.
As the economy seems currently to be moving
toward a sustainable expansion path, with a stabiliz-
ing rate of inflation, having an estimate of the OLIR
likewise seems crucial to making good policy in the
next few years. The issue is one that, in my view, the
FOMC and the staff should be looking at carefully.
Suppose, as I believe would be feasible, that the
FOMC were able to agree on a value or central ten-
dency for the OLIR, based on the results of staff
research and discussion among Committee mem-
bers. Of course, the value of the OLIR would only
be a rough approximation to the “truth,” but one
cannot avoid making such approximations in policy-
making, whether implicitly or explicitly. Should the
FOMC then take the next step and announce this
number to the public? Some have argued that such
an announcement would be unnecessary because
the Fed’s implicit inflation objective is already well
understood by the market. I am skeptical. Publicly
expressed preferences by FOMC members for long-
run inflation have ranged considerably, from less
than 1 percent to 2.5 percent or more. Long-run
inflation expectations implicit in the pricing of
inflation-indexed securities vary significantly over
time, and the apparently high sensitivity of long-term
nominal interest rates to Fed actions suggests some
uncertainty about the Fed’s long-run inflation target
(Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson, 2003). Gavin (2004)
points out that the range of private-sector forecasts
for inflation is typically higher for the United States
than for inflation-targeting countries.
If announcing the OLIR does not constrain short-
run policy unduly, I really cannot see any argument
against it. To reassure those worried about possible
loss of short-run flexibility, my proposal is that the
FOMC announce its value for the OLIR to the public
with the following provisos (not necessarily in these
exact words):
(i) The FOMC believes that the stated inflation
rate is the one that best promotes its output,
employment, and price stability goals in the
long run. Hence, in the long run, the FOMC
will try to guide the inflation rate toward the
stated value and maintain it near that value
on average over the business cycle.
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(ii) However, the FOMC regards this inflation rate
as a long-run objective only and sets no fixed
time frame for reaching it. In particular, in
deciding how quickly to move toward the
long-run inflation objective, the FOMC will
always take into account the implications for
near-term economic and financial stability.
As you can see, stating the OLIR with these
provisos places no unwanted constraints on short-
run monetary policy, leaving the Committee free to
deal with current financial and cyclical conditions as
the Committee sees fit. In this respect, the proposal
is very similar to one recently advanced by Governor
Gramlich (2003).
To be clear, because neither the horizon at
which the inflation objective is to be attained nor
the expected path of inflation and output is specified
under this proposal, what I am suggesting is not
equivalent to inflation targeting as commonly under-
stood. Instead, what is being proposed is an incre-
mental step that I believe would provide important
benefits in itself and which would leave the door
open for further steps later if that seemed appropri-
ate. In the language of Faust and Henderson (2004)
at this conference, my objective is to get the mean
of inflation right while leaving the determination of
the variance open for future discussion and debate.
Without any fixed time frames for reaching the
optimal long-run inflation rate, would an announced
value for the OLIR carry any credibility? I think it
would, for the important reason that the OLIR is not
an arbitrarily selected value. In particular, because
this inflation rate would have been judged by the
Committee to be the one under which the economy
operates best in the long run, the FOMC would have
an incentive to try to reach it eventually, even if it
were not an announced long-run objective of policy.
Thus, despite the lack of a time frame, the OLIR
should have long-run credibility; that is, it should
be the best (lowest-forecast-error) answer to the
question, What do you expect the average inflation
rate in the United States to be over the ten-year
period that begins (say) three years from now?
Additional reasons that the announcement
would carry weight are the accumulated credibility
of the Fed and the fact that we are presumably start-
ing from a point near the optimal inflation rate, so
that a period of costly disinflation will not be needed
to reach the OLIR. In other words, this relatively
unconstrained approach might not work for other
central banks, and it might not have worked for the
Fed at other times (e.g., when we were at early stages
of the disinflation process); but given the current
configuration of circumstances, it should work now.
I have argued that announcing the OLIR would
not have significant costs. What are the benefits?
In my view, the announcement of the OLIR should
serve as a useful clarification of the long-run objec-
tive of the Fed and would thereby provide a long-run
“anchor” to monetary policy. Among other benefits,
the announcement of the OLIR should help partici-
pants in financial markets price long-term bonds
and other financial assets more efficiently; help to
lower inflation risk in financial markets and in other
forms of contracting; and tend to stabilize long-term
inflation expectations more broadly, which in turn
would make short-run stabilization policy more
effective (Orphanides and Williams, 2003). Although
the announcement of the OLIR would not constrain
short-run policymaking in undesirable ways, it would
nevertheless also help the market make inferences
about the likely timing and extent of tightening and
easing cycles, since, all else equal, the FOMC would
want the inflation rate to move “asymptotically”
toward the long-run desired level. For example, if
the current inflation rate were known to be below
the OLIR, that fact would convey some information
about how long it will likely be before the Fed begins
its tightening cycle.
Because some of the principal benefits of
announcing the OLIR would arise from the reduction
of uncertainty in financial markets and in the econ-
omy more broadly, I prefer the announcement of a
single number for the OLIR, or at least a number
with a surrounding tolerance range that is as narrow
as the Committee can live with. I acknowledge that
the OLIR cannot be determined precisely. Neverthe-
less, to the extent that the FOMC is fairly indifferent
over a modest range of long-run inflation rates, there
would be a positive benefit to choosing a single
number within that range and trying to coordinate
public expectations on that number.
Agreeing on and announcing a value for the
OLIR might improve policymaking more directly,
at least on the margin. In particular, the stated infla-
tion objective would help guide policy during peri-
ods, like now, in which the economy is (we hope)
returning to a sustainable growth path; at all times,
it would also serve as a reminder to policymakers
to keep one eye on the long run at the same time
that they are reacting to current developments in
the economy. But, to reiterate, it seems likely that the
biggest gains would be in the area of communica-
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tions. Sharing the OLIR with the public would
address the most important information asymmetry
in the system: namely, the public’s imperfect knowl-
edge of the FOMC’s objectives. I believe this step
would help to reduce the reliance of the Fed on com-
plex and easily misinterpreted qualitative language
in its communications with the public.
I conclude with a word on the politics of this
proposal. One concern frequently expressed about
announcing an inflation objective is that the Congress
would interpret the introduction of an inflation target
as a repudiation of the dual mandate. This would
be a misinterpretation, but I understand why some
legislators might draw the wrong conclusion.
However, it seems to me that the recent attention
to the risk of deflation changes the political calculus.
There now exists a broad awareness that an inflation
rate that is too low, by raising the probability of
deflation and a binding zero bound on the nominal
interest rate, poses a threat to output and employ-
ment stability. Therefore the connection between
the announced OLIR and the real side of the econ-
omy will be much more apparent to non-economists.
Indeed, the entire rationale for the OLIR can be
expressed in terms of jobs and growth. The FOMC
might say to Congress: “We don’t want long-run
inflation to be too high, because low inflation pro-
motes growth and productivity. On the other hand,
inflation shouldn’t be too low, because we want to
have all the room we need to respond to the dangers
that deflation poses for output and employment.
We pose the objective in terms of inflation only
because that is what the Fed can control in the long
run.” It does not seem to me to be such a difficult
case to make in terms of the existing dual mandate.
In addition we would have the explicit proviso that
important short-run economic and financial goals
will not be sacrificed to reach the long-term inflation
objective more quickly. Although it would be impor-
tant to vet these ideas thoroughly with the relevant
Congressional committees before proceeding, I am
hopeful that a change of the type I am proposing
would be acceptable to Congress as being within
the spirit of existing legislation.
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hat is the ultimate objective of monetary
policy? What is the appropriate frame-
work for conducting monetary policy?
Central bankers and academics have been asking
these critical questions for decades. This conference,
in which I was honored to take part, was a milestone
in this long-standing debate.
It is a fact that never before in the history of
fiat money has there been so much consensus on
the benefits of a low-inflation environment, and
many central banks have achieved results consistent
with this conviction. This is a tremendous achieve-
ment and one that could easily lead us to think that
at last this long-standing debate has been settled
once and for all.
However, I do sometimes wonder whether we
are not too complacent in believing that the regime
of low inflation will be with us “from here to eternity.”
There is always a risk that even great achievements,
after a while, are taken as given and that their value
is only rediscovered when they are in danger of
becoming lost. In addition, recent history should
tell us that the structure of the economy changes
over time in a way that is difficult to anticipate and
perceive in real time. This continuous mutation
makes the task of monetary policy and its imple-
mentation even more challenging. It is the intrinsic
nature of the economy that makes the debate on
the aims of monetary policy and its appropriate
framework so difficult to settle, and I believe that
this debate will continue for some time to come.
In the course of the 1990s the inflation-targeting
framework for the conduct of monetary policy
has become popular among central banks and
academics. In this paper I will highlight some of what
I think are the distinguishing features and possible
pitfalls of this approach. I will then draw compari-
sons with the European Central Bank’s (ECB) mone-
tary policy strategy, also in the light of the ECB’s
clarification of its strategy in May 2003.
Thus, in section 2, I would like to put the current
debates on monetary policy into a historical perspec-
tive. In section 3, I will discuss what I see as the
critical aspects of the inflation-targeting approach.
Section 4 outlines the ECB’s monetary policy
approach and the ways in which it resembles and
differs from the inflation-targeting framework.
2. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Following the philosophy of “rules above
authorities”—to paraphrase slightly the title of
Henry Simons’ famous article (1936)—one strand
of research wanted the behavior of central bankers
to be strictly constrained by a rule for conducting
monetary policy. The most prominent advocate of
this was Milton Friedman and his famous k-percent
rule. The key argument in favor of the adoption of
a simple strict rule was the acknowledgment of the
economists’ and central bankers’ ignorance of the
exact functioning of the economy and the long and
variable time lags of monetary policy. It maintains
that the actors of monetary policy know too little
of the actual functioning of the economy to be able
to perform activist policy and their discretionary
actions would only exacerbate economic fluctuations
instead of smoothing them. Strict rules prevent such
problems, eliminating judgmental elements in mone-
tary policy action and avoiding activist policy.
However, during the 1960s, few central
bankers were in favor of rules, mostly because the
performance of discretionary monetary policy at
that time had been quite satisfactory, at least in the
United States, and policymakers were increasingly
confident of their ability to properly steer the per-
formance of the economy. The 1970s marked the
end of that overconfidence. In the period between
the first oil shock and the early 1980s, the world’s
major economies experienced two recessions while
inflation rose to double-digit levels. Although these
events were not fully under the control of the mone-
tary authorities, it is clear that the discretionary
approach to monetary policy did make a negative
contribution by not properly anchoring inflation
expectations and instead allowing them to drift.1
1 Among others, Orphanides and Williams (2003) show how the inter-
action of policy errors and endogenous expectation formation con-
tributed to stagflation in the 1970s.
Otmar Issing is a member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank. The author thanks Filippo Altissimo for his valuable contribution.
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, July/August 2004, 86(4), pp. 169-79.
© 2004, The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
 Panel Discussion REVIEW
170 JULY/AUGUST 2004
One of the lessons that economists learned from
their experience of the 1970s was that economic
agents’ expectations cannot be taken as given by
policymakers when choosing their policy action.
The underlying idea is simple but path-breaking
and goes back to at least Marschak (1947), although
the strongest case was made by Lucas (1976). In
forming their expectations and taking their actions,
economic agents will always try to anticipate future
policy moves. This makes expectations of future
policy relevant for today’s consumption and invest-
ment decisions and creates the room for strategic
interaction among economic agents, a cornerstone
of which is the credibility of the policymaker to
commit to a given set of actions. In the context of
monetary policy, Kydland and Prescott (1977) and
Barro and Gordon (1983) proposed models where
the desire of the central bank to attain an unemploy-
ment rate below the natural rate generates surprise
inflation in the economy: This is the “time consis-
tency” problem. Economic agents properly under-
standing the incentives of the monetary authority
and its actions would thus anticipate future inflation.
In equilibrium, this would end up generating the
well-known “inflation bias.” A superior outcome
could be achieved if monetary policy authorities
took into account the effect their behavior could
have on economic agents’ action and properly
commit not to inflate. The advantage of commitment
relative to discretion crucially hinges on the credi-
bility of the monetary authority actually sticking to
its promises.
From those original contributions a large strand
of literature tried to devise incentive-compatible
institutional schemes capable of enforcing a rule-
type behavior and thus dealing with the time incon-
sistency problem. General consensus has emerged
that a necessary prerequisite for solving the time
inconsistency problem is the establishment of an
independent central bank to which the management
of monetary policy is then delegated. The institu-
tional arrangement mostly adopted to enforce the
commitment accepts that monetary policy should
treat the natural rate of unemployment as a given,
and not try to push unemployment below its natural
rate.2
These results square with another finding of the
1970s, namely, the absence of any long-run trade-
off between unemployment and inflation. This point
was stressed by Friedman in his 1977 Nobel lecture,
among others. Friedman’s argument was that, while
it is possible to stimulate the economy in the short
run by some form of monetary illusion, workers
would see through the illusion in the longer run,
demanding higher wages and so bringing employ-
ment back to its natural level. Every effort to per-
manently push employment above its natural level
is therefore self-defeating.
These arguments reinforced the original criticism
of discretionary monetary policy and were the
final nails in the coffin of the theory of an activist
monetary policy (and the idea of a monetary policy
seeking to push economic activity above its natural
level). The focus of monetary policy action had to
be price stability.
The awareness of the limitations of monetary
policy was also coupled with a better understanding
of the possible costs of inflation and the recognition
that a low-inflation environment is a necessary
precondition for long-run growth and an efficient
allocation of resources.3
Taken together, the awareness of the cost of
inflation, of the absence of a long-run trade-off
between inflation and real activity, and of the rele-
vance of the credibility problem of the monetary
authority are some of the motivations underlying
the widespread adoption of a culture of price stabil-
ity among the central banks of the industrialized
countries during the 1980s and 1990s. I have no
doubt that this new culture has made an important
contribution to the disinflation process that we have
observed in many countries over the past two
decades.4
The inflation experience of the 1970s and
developments in the theory of monetary policy
analysis over the past 20 years have made clear the
importance of the monetary authority making a
firm commitment. However, contrary to the debate
of the 1960s, it is a commitment on an objective
rather than on a simple rule. Once an agreement
on the objective had been reached, another critical
question remained: Which is the best strategy for
achieving this final objective? Over the years central
bankers and academics around the world have
3 For references on the theoretical and empirical literature on the cost
of inflation, see Issing (2001) and Rodriguez-Palenzuela, Camba-
Mendez, and Garcia (2003).
4 Citing the words of another member of the discussion panel of this
conference: “A number of factors have contributed to the reestablish-
ment of price stability, but surely an essential ingredient has been
the attention that the Federal Reserve has paid to long-run trends in
inflation and inflation expectations since 1979” (Kohn, forthcoming).
2 See Walsh (1998) for a survey.
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proposed a variety of strategies. Different central
banks have adopted strategies that place different
emphasis on the various pieces of information, or
elements of their decisionmaking process, or dif-
ferent aspects of their communication policies. 
Inflation targeting is one of those strategies.
Following the pioneering approach of the Reserve
Bank of New Zealand in the early 1990s, a large
number of central banks have formally adopted an
“inflation targeting framework”; and today we can
count around 20 central banks that refer to this
approach. At the same time the inflation-targeting
framework has triggered a large amount of interest-
ing and stimulating theoretical work, as indeed this
conference testifies.5 Looking back at the experience
of those central banks, there is no doubt that it has
been a success. This is particularly evident in the
case of countries starting from high levels of inflation.
These countries needed to implement a disinflation-
ary process, where inflation targeting served to guide
inflation expectations and provide an explicit frame-
work and direction to monetary policy. The approach
has also turned out to be successful in countries
with lower inflation, as, for example, the positive
experience of the United Kingdom, Sweden, and
Canada shows. In the few cases—limited to some
emerging economies—where the experience has
been somewhat less successful, it is quite evident
that problems originated in other areas—notably,
often stemming from misguided fiscal policies.6
At the same time, while not adopting an inflation-
targeting approach, some major central banks have
also achieved and maintained price stability, proving
that visible success in the management of monetary
policy is not confined to inflation-targeting central
banks.
In the rest of this paper I will try to substantiate
this claim. 
3. INFLATION TARGETING
There is a vast amount of literature on inflation
targeting, and the first challenge to some readers’
eyes is to decide upon a proper definition. Different
authors have proposed different, and in some cases
conflicting, definitions.7
The first and broadest definition of inflation
targeting is simply a monetary policy framework
that accords overriding importance to the mainte-
nance of price stability, typically defined as a low
and stable rate of consumer price inflation.8 As
pointed out in the previous section, given the broad
consensus that price stability is the appropriate
goal of monetary policy, the strategies pursued by
most central banks, including the ECB, would fall
under this loose definition. However, this definition
suffers from two interrelated weaknesses. First, from
the policymaking perspective, it offers no practical
guidance for the conduct of monetary policy beyond
identifying the primary objective. As such, its prac-
tical relevance is rather limited. Second, from a
scientific perspective, the definition imposes few
empirically testable restrictions on the implemen-
tation of monetary policy. As such, it does not allow
inflation-targeting strategies to be distinguished
from other stability-oriented strategies and their
relative merits to be evaluated. Central banks that
have pursued strategies other than inflation targeting
cannot be meaningfully distinguished on the basis
of this definition. For example, Deutsche Bundesbank
has been classified as an inflation-targeting central
bank by some, despite its long adherence to an
intermediate monetary targeting strategy. To put it
more provocatively, by this definition all “successful”
central banks are inflation targeters, while all
“unsuccessful” central banks are not.
Given the problems associated with this broad
definition, in the remainder of this paper I will focus
on alternative, more restrictive definitions of infla-
tion targeting. Consistent with the existing academic
literature on monetary policy, such narrower defi-
nitions are typically expressed in terms of a mone-
tary policy framework based on the adoption of a
monetary policy rule in which forecasts of future
inflation play a central role, either in the form of
the so-called instrument rules or of target rules.
An instrument rule expresses the monetary
policy instrument—usually a short-term nominal
interest rate—as a simple and usually linear function
of deviation of a few key macroeconomic variables,
generally inflation and the output gap, from their
target levels. Usually the literature distinguishes
between an outcome-based rule (if the instrument
is a function of currently observable variables, as
8 Bernanke and Mishkin (1997, p. 97) write: “[Inflation targeting] is
characterized, as the name suggests, by the announcement of official
target ranges for the inflation rate…and by explicit acknowledgement
that low and stable inflation is the overriding goal of monetary policy.”
5 For references on inflation targeting, see, among the others, Bernanke
et al. (1999) and Svensson (1997, 1999, 2000, 2003).
6 See Sims (forthcoming) for an example that a sound fiscal policy is a
prerequisite for the performance of an inflation-targeting framework.
7 See, for example, the two definitions proposed by Amato and Gerlach
(2002) and Svensson (2002) in the same volume of the European
Economic Review.Panel Discussion REVIEW
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in Taylor, 1993) and a forecast-based rule (if the
instrument is an explicit function of the current
forecast for key variables in the future).
Under a target rule, the appropriate setting for
the monetary policy instrument is defined implicitly
as the solution to an optimization problem facing
the central bank. This optimization problem is
defined by two elements: first, an explicit loss func-
tion describing the costs associated with deviations
of specific goal variable(s) from their target levels;
and, second, a structural model of the economy.
Minimization of the loss function subject to the con-
straints imposed by the economy’s structure (as
captured by the model) implicitly defines a model-
specific optimal interest rate reaction function, which
determines the interest rate as a function of all
relevant state variables. In this context, an inflation-
targeting framework is characterized by the adoption
of a loss function that focuses on the deviations of
forecast inflation from a target level.9
There is a natural complementarity between
instrument and target rule characterizations of
inflation targeting. A target rule implicitly defines
an instrument rule—albeit typically one that is com-
plex and therefore difficult to use in presenting
policy decisions to the public. Similarly, it is usually
possible to derive a loss function and an economic
model that would broadly support a specific instru-
ment rule as the solution to an optimization problem
facing the central bank.
Here, I do not want to enter the vast debate on
the different definitions of and the choice between
instrument and target rules.10 Nor will I address many
of the problematic issues identified by the literature
and associated with the adoption of those rules, such
as the indeterminacy of equilibria, the issue of
commitment to the rules, and the important aspect
concerning the measurement of key variables, for
example, the output gap.11 Instead what I wish to
discuss here are two more practical pitfalls associated
with the narrower definition of inflation targeting,
namely, the central role of macroeconomic forecasts
in inflation targeting, on the one hand, and the
robustness of the rules in view of the possible
presence of model misspecifications, on the other.
Information Content and Forecasts
As pointed out above, simple outcome-based
instrument rules constrain the central bank to
respond only to developments in observed inflation
and the output gap, and thus not to make use of other
available evidence about the state of the economy.
However, it is widely recognized that an efficient
monetary policy should exploit all relevant informa-
tion. By imposing an arbitrary partition on the data,
simple instrument rules do not adopt such a full-
information approach. This raises the issue of
whether those rules can be incentive-compatible.
If a central bank is aware of information suggesting
that the interest rate implied by the rule might be
inappropriate (e.g., because of weakness in the finan-
cial system), it would have an incentive to deviate
from the rule. Given the incentive for such deviations,
it is questionable whether central banks would follow
such a rule and thus whether the ex ante commit-
ment to this rule can be credible. However, if the
rule lacked credibility, it is unlikely to help stabilize
private inflation and interest rate expectations.
Forecast-based rules partially overcome the
information restrictions imposed by outcome-based
Taylor-like rules, making the instrument respond
to expectations of future inflation and the output
gap. To quote Haldane and Batini (1998): “expected
inflation ought to embody all information contained
within the myriad indicators that affect the future
path of inflation.” Along the same lines, Clarida, Galí,
and Gertler (2000) characterize forecast-based rules
as making use of “a broad array of information
(beyond lagged inflation and output) to form beliefs
about the future condition of the economy, a feature
that we find highly realistic.”
However, this opens the door to the problem of
the complexity of the construction and nature of
the forecast. For example, which is the proper model
to forecast? What is the proper way of treating the
central bank’s monetary policy responses in the
future projection or of using market participants’
forecasts?12 Instead of tackling these issues, let me
12 See Bernanke and Woodford (1997) for an exposition of the circularity
problem induced by monetary policy mechanically responding to
private inflation forecasts.
9 This definition corresponds to what is now usually labeled as “strict
inflation targeting.” In “flexible inflation targeting,” on the other hand,
the loss function of the monetary authority focuses on both deviations
of inflation and output from their targets.
10 McCallum (2001b) adds the following disclaimer: “In fact, I believe that
my terminology is more consistent with actual practice, in part because
actual central banks have thus far not adopted explicit loss functions.
In any event, the issue is of little importance, especially since it is
always possible to write instrument rules that approximate as closely
as desired the instrument settings of a policy regime involving targeting
in Svensson’s sense.”
11 See Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2001), Svensson (2003), and
Svensson and Woodford (2003).
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focus on another main critique by challenging the
view that forecasts, particularly inflation forecasts,
are sufficient statistics on the state of the economy
and for monetary policy.
To exemplify, let us begin by assuming that the
only objective of policy is to maintain price stability.
If prices move in tandem with the existing tension
on employable resources, the policy goal of price
stability dictates keeping the economy continuously
close to its potential. Under these circumstances,
reacting to a pure inflation forecast figure, with no
reference to any additional indicator of macro-
economic performance, would be a recipe for policy
mismanagement any time the economy is hit by a
transitory (say, favorable) supply shock. This type
of shock would entail both a downward blip in fore-
cast inflation and an upward movement of output
away from its sustainable level. Hence, restricting
the central bank’s information set solely to the infla-
tion forecast figure—to the exclusion of a broader
suite of other indicators, which help discriminate
between supply and demand shocks—would, in
this situation, call for a policy easing today, which
could destabilize the economy by laying the ground
for the build-up of inflationary pressures tomorrow.
This is an elementary example of the general
proposition that inflation forecasts alone are not
sufficient to reveal the nature of the threat to price
stability and that it would therefore be misleading
to follow a rule that requires setting the policy instru-
ment simply as the function of a forecast. Even in
an ideal world in which the models producing the
forecast are properly specified, the policymakers
are not interested in the result of the forecast per se
but instead aim at a consistent economic picture—
or, to put it differently, they aim at identifying the
relevant shocks underlying the forecasts and how
different types of disturbances to the economy imply
different kinds of policy responses. The relation
between forecasts and underlying shocks is clearly
one-to-one in many simple stylized models used in
the monetary policy literature, but this relation
clearly breaks down once we depart from that simple
set-up. So, once again, forecasts of a few macro-
variables cannot be sufficient statistics to determine
monetary policy action.
Target rules are somehow immune from the
above problem, given that they are routinely imple-
mented by producing forecasts of future inflation
and output conditional on the path of the policy
instrument and searching for the path, which mini-
mizes a proper loss function. Consequently, when
evaluating inflation targeting in the context of target
rules, the discussion should primarily focus on the
structural model used to define the central bank’s
constrained optimization problem. In other words,
an evaluation of the target rule characterization of
inflation targeting is largely equivalent to an evalua-
tion of the economic model employed to derive that
rule.13 One criticism of the models underlying most
target rule characterizations of inflation targeting is
that they neglect any role that might be played by
the monetary aggregate or financial frictions in the
determination of price developments. This opens the
way to a second set of remarks on the issue of model
misspecification and the robustness of the rules.
Robustness and Model Misspecification
The possible presence of model misspecification
is something that economists and econometricians
have some difficulty in acknowledging. However,
every model we write down and estimate contains
some form of shortcut and approximation. This
uncertainty is worsened since economists have not
yet agreed upon a proper, commonly accepted
approximating model. This implies that the appro-
priateness of a monetary policy strategy cannot be
evaluated only within a particular class of model—
rather a good strategy has to perform well across a
variety of empirically plausible models.
However, most advocates of inflation targeting—
at least those referring to simple rules for monetary
policy decisions—ultimately rely on a view of the
economy whose essence can be captured by no more
than three equations. The defining characteristics
of these equations are (i) staggered pricing, (ii) the
centrality of the output gap (or Phillips curve), and
(iii) the notion that monetary impulses propagate
primarily via a price (interest rate) channel, with
monetary quantities playing no role.
The presence of only a market for goods and
the absence of a fully formalized market for assets
whose supply is inelastic in the short run implies
that money has no role other than to facilitate the
exchange of goods. Decisions about money holdings
are not seen as part of a wider portfolio decision
that—at times—may lead households to prefer
liquidity over risky assets. For example, a positive
change in money demand has no counterpart in
13 While Svensson (2003, p. 450) says “[forecast targeting] does not imply
that forecasts must be exclusively model-based,” I would not tackle
the slippery issue of the use of judgmental information in the fore-
casting process.
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an excess supply of some other asset. On the con-
trary, if truly alternative assets were to exist whose
issuance was related to their private issuers’ invest-
ment decisions and capital formation, then generating
a higher (or lower) supply of money—at any given
interest rate—could become all but inconsequential.
Quoting McCallum (2001a), there is “nothing
fundamentally misguided” about the model used
by advocates of inflation targeting. Such a model is
internally consistent and elegant. It can also mimic
the observed behavior of modern economies in
“normal” circumstances. Yet it rests upon what can
certainly be regarded as extreme assumptions about
the role of money in the economy. A central bank
can legitimately question the usefulness of a model
for monetary policy-setting in which money has
been deprived of its basic liquidity—or, equivalently,
its “store-of-value”—function that generations of
scholars have recognized and discussed for decades
(cf. Hahn, 1990, inter alia).
Levin, Wieland, and Williams (1999, 2001)
demonstrate that Taylor-like instrument rules per-
form quite robustly in a particular set of macro-
economic models. However, this robustness does
not survive a broadening of the suite of candidate
models beyond those considered in these papers.
Suitably parameterized Taylor-like rules appear to
work well in stabilizing the economy within the con-
fines of the mainstream New Keynesian paradigm,
in which money market equilibrium conditions are
redundant. This last assumption, in particular, proves
to be absolutely crucial. If financial markets are not
free of frictions, then Taylor-like rules often do not
prove to be robust and yield suboptimal outcomes.
Examples of financial market frictions are promi-
nent in transmission mechanism literature, e.g., in
so-called limited participation models (Christiano
and Eichenbaum, 1992) or segmented markets
models (Alvarez, Lucas, and Weber 2001). Within
the class of limited participation models, Christiano
and Gust (1999) show that the set of parameters
under which a Taylor-like inflation-targeting rule
becomes a source of instability is much broader
than for mainstream New Keynesian models.
More recently, Alvarez, Lucas, and Weber (2001)
presented some experiments on the stabilization
properties of simple Taylor rules within a segmented
financial markets model. They conclude that central
banks pursuing a Taylor-like interest rate instrument
rule—by systematically ignoring money market
(velocity) shocks—censor the information set avail-
able to policymakers and thereby reduce the effec-
tiveness of their responses to economic shocks by
arbitrarily excluding relevant monetary information
from the policy decision. In a similar vein, but in a
different class of model, Christiano and Rostagno
(2001) show that a Taylor-like interest rate instrument
rule can generate equilibria with undesirable prop-
erties; this outcome could be avoided by a policy
rule that takes into account the information provided
by monetary aggregates.
It should be clear that, from the view point of a
central bank, a serious attempt should be made to
construct a model where shocks to velocity are
treated appropriately within the context of broader
portfolio shifts, possibly in the presence of (changing)
risk assessments. Unless disturbances in money
holdings are formalized in such a way as to reflect
financial decisions, then nothing can be said about
the role of money in the business cycle and insuffi-
cient policy advice can be drawn from analyses of
models that do not properly tackle these problems.
4. THE ECB’S MONETARY POLICY
STRATEGY
Let me now turn to the ECB’s monetary policy
strategy. The ECB started to conduct policy in 1999
with the inception of the euro. While taking stock
of the experience of the central banks of the
Eurosystem, the ECB was at the time facing a major
institutional change. Eleven national economies14
merged into a unified market almost overnight; in
this context, past experience and data might turn
out not to be particularly informative with regard
to the new economic structure.
In the presence of such Knightian uncertainty,
in October 1998 the Governing Council of the ECB
announced its monetary policy strategy. The designed
strategy was a novel one, suited to the special and
still partially unknown characteristics of the euro
area, and different in a number of respects from
other current and past strategies.
Three aspects of the ECB strategy are critical.
First, its focus on the price stability objective: Price
stability is enshrined in the Treaty on European
Union as being the primary objective of the ECB. The
ECB Governing Council therefore provided a quanti-
tative definition of price stability as a year-on-year
increase of the Harmonized Index of Consumer
Prices (HICP) below 2 percent.15 A second, closely
14 Twelve from January 2001, when Greece also adopted the euro.
15 See Issing et al. (2001) and ECB (2001a) for a detailed description of
the ECB’s monetary policy strategy.
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related element, is the medium-term orientation of
our policy. Central banks can only affect the price
level with “long and uncertain lags”; consequently
they cannot be overambitious and try to steer price
developments in the short run, nor should they seek
to precisely define the horizon of their action. More-
over they need to respond gradually to economic
shocks, taking output fluctuations into account. A
third element of the strategy relates to the analyses
and economic perspectives that ultimately guide
policy decisions. The strategy recognizes the need
for a comprehensive analysis of economic and finan-
cial shocks and dynamics but, at the same time, it
attaches a privileged role to indicators based on
monetary aggregates. This organization of the infor-
mation has been labeled the “two-pillar” strategy
of the ECB. The ECB’s monetary policy strategy was
meant to provide a transparent and consistent con-
ceptual framework: structuring the internal analysis
of the economic situation and risks to price stability,
facilitating the decisionmaking process in the
Governing Council, and communicating policy
decisions to the public at large.
In almost five years of experience with the ECB
monetary policy, the strategy has served all these
functions to a high level of satisfaction. The ECB has
pursued its mandate of maintaining price stability
with vigor and determination, gaining a high level
of credibility from the outset. This achievement is
all the more remarkable given that the ECB started
without a track record and in an uncertain environ-
ment. Testifying to this success, inflation expecta-
tions, as measured by survey data and by financial
market indicators, have remained consistent with
our definition of price stability.16
In December 2002 the ECB announced the
decision to conduct a comprehensive review of its
strategy. This decision was sometimes wrongly inter-
preted by observers as an implicit indication of dis-
satisfaction with the strategy. In fact, the opposite
was true. To ensure the continued satisfactory devel-
opment of the strategy in a complex and changing
environment, it was only natural that, after more
than four years of experience, the ECB Governing
Council would want to look back and reflect in a
systematic way on past experience. The outcome
of the strategy review was made public on May 8,
2003, and it aimed primarily at addressing certain
misunderstandings that have emerged in our com-
munication with the public.17
Regarding the definition of price stability, the
Governing Council confirmed the explicit quantita-
tive definition announced back in October 1998.
However, in continuing with the past conduct of
monetary policy, the Governing Council clarified
that in the pursuit of price stability it will aim to
maintain inflation rates below but close to 2 percent
over the medium term. This clarification emphasizes
the need for a sufficient safety margin against the
risk of deflation and at the same time is also sufficient
to cover the potential presence of a measurement
bias in the HICP and the implications of inflation
differentials of a structural nature within the euro
area.
Regarding the role of money in the strategy
framework, the Governing Council confirmed that
the strategy’s two-pillar framework is an effective
tool for organizing the information used to assess the
risks to price stability. As discussed in the previous
section, the economic literature confirms that inte-
grating the analysis of monetary aggregates with
the analysis of conditions on the goods and labor
markets in a unified model remains an elusive
challenge. Different types of analysis provide infor-
mation relevant for price developments at different
time horizons. What we labeled as economic analy-
sis focuses on the most proximate causes of inflation,
such as cost developments and demand-supply
imbalances, and primarily contributes to the assess-
ment of short- to medium-term economic dynamics
and the risks to price stability at that horizon. Mone-
tary analysis, on the other hand, focuses instead on
the ultimate monetary determinants of inflation,
and primarily contains information for assessing
price trends at medium- to long-term horizons.
The Governing Council clarified that the monetary
analysis mainly serves as a means of cross-checking,
from a medium- to long-term perspective, the short-
to medium-term indications coming from the econ-
omic analysis.
Let me emphasize the role of the cross-checking.
All the information coming from different sources,
such as short-term conjunctural indicators, quarterly
macroeconomic forecasts, the analysis of asset prices
and monetary aggregates, have to be compared and
properly evaluated to come to an overall assessment
of the monetary policy stance. This ensures that,
17 The outcome of the strategy review and the background documents
can be found at www.ecb.int.
16 See the evidence provided in Castelnuovo, Nicoletti-Altimari, and
Rodriguez-Palenzuela (2003).
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while responding to economic shocks as they mani-
fest themselves, we do not lose sight of the fact that,
in the longer term, developments in money need
to be consistent with our objective. This helps, in
my view, to give a sense of direction and impart a
steady course to the conduct of monetary policy.
The Eurosystem staff macroeconomic projec-
tions18 are one important input into the monetary
policy decision as a way of organizing a large amount
of information and helping to create a consistent
picture of possible future developments, but with-
out making them the sole input for the conduct of
monetary policy. As discussed in the previous sec-
tion, forecasts cannot be, per se, a sufficient statistic
for policy, nor can they contain all relevant informa-
tion, not least because the models underlying the
forecast are inevitably misspecified to some extent.
There are instances that standard macroecon-
omic models, which, by definition, are constructed
to replicate normal conditions and regularities in
the economy, are unable to capture and incorporate.
This is particularly the case when large shocks or
special circumstances arise, such as episodes of
financial instability or asset price bubbles. I am
merely recalling the developments over the past two
to three years, when we faced exceptional uncertain-
ties and major stock market movements followed
by large portfolio adjustment. How those past events
can be squared with forecasts of inflation and out-
put, based on models in which financial assets do
not play any active role, is still an open issue both
for central bankers and academics. In such occasions
the need of careful judgment, of a broadening of
the horizon for the conduct of policy, and of the
consideration of non-standard indicators and differ-
ent interpretations of the evidence become espe-
cially relevant.19
Of course this does not mean that the ECB does
not make full use of models. On the contrary, the
ECB devotes a lot of time and resources to improving
the set of economic models that are used in-house
to gain a better understanding of the euro area econ-
omy and provide better guidance for monetary
policy decisionmaking. Like many other central
banks, we do use quite a large menu of models rang-
ing from simple time-series models, useful in short-
term forecasting, up to medium-size structural
macroeconometric models in both area-wide and
multi-country specifications.20 Compared with
purely time-series or reduced-form models, structural
models have the advantage of having a well-specified
conceptual framework (or a set of identification
assumptions) that help to provide some better econ-
omic interpretation of the results, i.e., “the story
behind the numbers.” Moreover, considerable effort
has recently been devoted to the development of
“state of the art” medium-sized stochastic dynamic
general equilibrium models (SDGE), where the esti-
mated specification is fully micro-funded and consis-
tent with the solution of the optimization problem
of economic agents. Those models have proved to
combine a solid theoretical grounding with a good
ability to replicate many relevant features of the euro
area data. Smets and Wouters (2003) proposed an
extended version of the standard New Keynesian
SDGE closed-economy model with sticky prices
and wages. Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno (2003)
substantially extended a stylized real-sector SDGE
model to include a fully formalized financial sector,
where the issuance of assets is related to firms’ need
to finance entrepreneurial activity, although there
are frictions in the activity of the intermediaries
related to the cost paid to monitor firms.
As a central banker but also as an academic, I
am looking forward to the results of this line of
research given that it provides macro models with
both a solid micro-foundation and good empirical
properties, and with the potential to bring into the
picture phenomena of a monetary and financial
nature that are often left out of the more commonly
used macro models.
5. CONCLUSION
Let me end by saying that, in practice, probably
no central bank follows the strict characterization
of inflation targeting and that differences in the
practices of central banks oriented to price stability
should not be exaggerated. Most of the central banks
oriented to price stability share a number of key
elements that guide the conduct of their monetary
policy, namely, a clear, quantitative definition of the
overriding objective, a forward-looking orientation
20 See Fagan, Henry, and Mestre (2001) for a description of the area-wide
model of the euro area.
18 See ECB (2001b) for a description of the Eurosystem staff macroecon-
omic projection exercise. Within our framework, we clearly separate
the production of projections, as carried out under the responsibility
of the staff, from the monetary policy decisions taken under the respon-
sibility of the Governing Council in order to avoid any ambiguity
between the assumptions of the projections and the policy implications.
19 See Issing (2002) for a discussion on the usefulness of information
stemming from monetary aggregates in revisiting some historical
episodes of financial instability.
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of their policy, and the awareness of the need to
take a broad range of information into account and
to communicate with the public in a clear and
transparent manner.
There is no clear-cut evidence to suggest that
generally, and according to some well-specified
criteria, one specific framework should be preferred
to all others.21 Take, for example, one crucial meas-
ure of our success as central bankers: the ability to
firmly anchor long-term inflation expectations.
These appear to be well anchored, in terms of the
very low volatility of expectations as well as the very
low correlation with actual inflation developments,
in most industrialized countries or currency areas,
including those where central banks do not usually
consider themselves to be “inflation targeters,” such
as the United States and the euro area. This to me
is just a confirmation of something that I always
believed: that there is no “single” or “best” way to
conduct monetary policymaking and that different
approaches or frameworks can lead to successful
policies and/or be better adapted to different insti-
tutional, economic, and social environments.
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should start with two declarations. First, the
usual disclaimer holds with particular force
today—the views I am about to express are
my own and not necessarily those of any other
policymaker at the Federal Reserve. Second, this
conference has been most interesting and informa-
tive, but I remain an inflation targeting (IT) skeptic.
I will briefly lay out the reasons for my attitude,
then address some topics, such as communication,
that frequently arise in the discussion, and conclude
by trying to stress-test my skepticism by speculating
on whether IT would have been helpful in some
recent episodes related to monetary policy. 
INFLATION TARGETING FOR THE
UNITED STATES
I agree with advocates of IT in several critical
areas. Price stability—or its approximation at very
low inflation—is the appropriate primary long-term
objective of monetary policy, and achieving this
objective is the way that policy can best contribute
to the long-term welfare of the country. Moreover,
in some countries, adopting IT, together with the
central bank independence that often accompanies
the initiation of IT regimes, has been a major step
toward attaining price stability.
The question I would like to address is whether
IT would improve economic performance in the
United States. That is, would IT be likely to lead to
actions by policymakers and private agents that
increase the odds on keeping the economy produc-
ing at its maximum sustainable level and inflation
low and stable. In my view, the verdict on IT for the
United States is at least “not proven” and possibly
negative—that is, IT might detract from economic
performance over time.
I start from the premise that the United States
has had a very successful monetary policy over the
past two decades. We have achieved price stability,
inflation expectations are low and stable, and we
have done this with two relatively shallow recessions
in 20 years. Many factors have contributed to this
economic performance, but monetary policy has
been an important element. So, for me, the default
option is to keep doing what we have been doing—
however hard it might be to model or explain. And
that is not inflation targeting. I believe that adopting
IT, even in its softer versions, would be a slight shift
along the continuum of constrained discretion in
the direction of constraint, and the benefits of
such a shift are unlikely to outweigh its costs. Conse-
quently, I would stick with the status quo. 
On the cost side, I believe that under some
circumstances central banks do face short-term
trade-offs between economic stability and inflation
stability, and I am concerned that IT would result in
less-than-optimal attention being paid to stabilizing
the economy and financial markets. In its actions,
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 the Federal Reserve has put considerable weight
on achieving and maintaining price stability, but it
has not been “inflation targeting”—not even implic-
itly. IT implies putting a higher priority on hitting a
particular inflation objective over the intermediate
run than the Federal Reserve has done.
This point is most obvious from 1983 to 1997,
in the so-called opportunistic disinflation period.
During this time, the Federal Reserve was well aware
that inflation was running above levels consistent
with price stability but concentrated on keeping
inflation from rising, not on reducing it further.
I believe the Federal Reserve also paid more
attention to non-inflation factors than IT would have
suggested in the 1997 to 2003 period, even though
inflation outcomes were low and stable. Its broader
focus was especially evident in the reaction to the
threat to financial stability in the fall of 1998 and
in the very aggressive easing in early 2001. In the
latter case, easing continued through the spring
even though inflation expectations looked as though
they might be increasing, which would have been
very difficult for an IT central bank to ignore. I recog-
nize that such responses would in theory be avail-
able under flexible IT, but I wonder what would
happen in practice. Most IT frameworks put a priority
on inflation control and base their communication
and accountability structures on inflation forecasts
and outcomes. Under circumstances in which short-
run conflicts among various objectives are possible,
I ask myself where IT policymakers are likely to
take their chances. 
Moreover, with its concentration on mean
inflation, IT seems to be ill-adapted to the risk-
management paradigm that Chairman Greenspan
(2003) laid out in Jackson Hole. That mode of oper-
ation, which I believe has been an important factor
in the Federal Reserve’s success, weighs the skews
in the outlook, as well as the central tendencies, and
also takes account of the cost of missing on one side
or the other—and for more than one objective.
I think that the U.S. economy has benefited
from the flexibility that the Federal Reserve has
derived by eschewing a formal inflation target. By
flexibility I mean not frequent changes in long-term
objectives but rather the freedom to deviate from
long-term price stability, perhaps for a while. I rec-
ognize that such deviations are also possible in
models of flexible IT, but I question whether they
can occur in practice.
Against these potential costs, I believe that the
benefits of IT in the United States relative to the
current regime are questionable.
We do not see evidence in IT economies that
inflation is lower or more stable or that output is
more stable around potential. On the surface, then,
IT appears to produce little or no gain in hitting goals.
To be sure, the evidence on how well inflation expec-
tations are anchored is more mixed. Levin, Natalucci,
and Piger (2004) at this conference, provided some
backing for the idea that long-term expectations in
IT economies respond less to incoming information
on inflation. But I am also aware that the bulk of
the studies show that interest rates and inflation
are no more predictable in IT economies than in
non-IT economies. The IT economies examined in
the studies may have been subject to larger shocks
than the non-IT economies studied, but the burden
of proof should be on the advocates of IT to show
that it would improve economic performance in non-
IT economies—by providing either greater cyclical
stability or better resource allocation.
A frequently used argument for IT in the United
States is that it will help to extend the good perform-
ance of monetary policy as leadership changes—
that is, it will protect against persistent increases or
decreases in inflation under a new chairman. In
my view, however, considerable safeguards against
these outcomes are already in place. The law man-
dates price stability. Without exception, everyone
now on the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
agrees with this mandate, and it enjoys wide accept-
ance in the public and in the Congress as well as in
the academic community. Moreover, FOMC members
have diverse views and the Committee has been
operating in an environment in which members
are free to express those views—in sharp contrast
to some earlier eras. Any chairman gets deference,
but a new chairman would not have the clout of
Alan Greenspan, at least initially. A further safeguard
is provided by the greater amount of public discus-
sion and media attention to monetary policy cur-
rently than in the 1960s and 1970s.
Of course there is a risk, however small, that
incompetence or political motivations in a new
leader might foster new trends or greater variability
in inflation, and IT might help counter any such
tendencies. The question is whether insuring against
this remote outcome is worth paying the cost. IT
prevents some bad results, but it tends to foreclose
very good results as well.
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SPECIAL TOPICS
Communications and Transparency
IT does provide a clear framework for commu-
nicating with the public if communication is framed
mostly around the behavior of inflation relative to
the target. But does it help produce better policy
and economic outcomes? For flexible inflation tar-
geters who are paying attention to other objectives
as well as inflation, communication tends to be clear
but not especially transparent. Other goals are
downgraded. In practice, IT communication does
not even mention varying time periods for achieving
price stability, much less the reason for those periods
to vary. Those other goals are the tough messy stuff
that does not fit into the IT framework very well.
That they get so little attention is not surprising
because accountability is usually framed in terms
of inflation and the reports are elements in the
accountability framework. But if, in fact, the goals
of economic and financial stability are factored into
policy decisions, they are often poorly acknowledged
in IT communication. There is also a risk that com-
munication will drive policy, and so those goals end
up with less-than-optimal attention. For the most
part, the manifestations of better transparency—
reduced variability and greater predictability of
inflation and interest rates—are not readily apparent
in IT economies. 
I am not arguing that the Federal Reserve can-
not communicate better. But I am saying that IT is
not a cure-all for communication problems; that it
might not even help much in the markets where it
really counts; and that, if simplicity of communica-
tions drives policy, IT might lead to inferior econ-
omic outcomes.
Political Legitimacy
In his paper at this conference, Larry Meyer
(2004) was right to emphasize the importance of
the Federal Reserve’s interactions with the political
system. One of the major values of IT is its role in
forcing the people and their representatives to think
through carefully what they can and cannot expect
or demand from a central bank. This benefit would
be lost through unilateral adoption of IT by the
Federal Reserve.
The Federal Reserve is in a more complex posi-
tion within the government relative to the central
banks of many other countries, and this position
both complicates any consultative process and ele-
vates its importance. The checks and balances of
our system mean that, unlike most other central
banks, which operate in a parliamentary system, we
do not have a “government” to interact with. The
paradigm of goal dependence/instrument independ-
ence so common in IT regimes is effectively blocked
for us. If we moved toward setting a goal for our-
selves, perhaps even if we just defined price stability,
we would need to consult carefully with both houses
of the Congress and the Administration and would
need to judge what, short of legislation, constituted
a veto by any of the people with whom we were
consulting. This process would be subtle and diffi-
cult—but absolutely essential to protect our inde-
pendence and preserve our democratic legitimacy.
Defining Price Stability
By “defining price stability,” I mean publishing
a number or a reference range that makes more
concrete our long-term inflation objective, without
making a commitment to achieve that objective in
any given time frame. Individual FOMC members
are increasingly stating their numerical definition
of price stability, but the Federal Open Market Com-
mittee has not done it. In some respects, such a
specification is an appealing idea. In concept, it
might allow the United States to realize some of
the benefits of inflation targeting without some of
the costs. The theory would be that putting a numeri-
cal value on long-term price stability could reduce
uncertainty about longer-run price tendencies with-
out constraining our actions to stabilize the econ-
omy or financial markets over shorter periods.
I am still trying to make up my mind on the
balance of costs and benefits of taking this step. As
I have already noted, most evidence does not suggest
a lot of private uncertainty about longer-term price
trends in the United States, and so the benefits, if
any, would be limited. Spreads between nominal
and indexed 10-year bonds have fluctuated narrowly
around 2 percent since 1999, and survey measures
of long-term inflation expectations have barely
moved in recent years. Nonetheless, further evi-
dence supporting the inference of Levin, Natalucci,
and Piger that IT would result in even more firmly
anchored expectations would be important in this
equation.
The costs, given my views on IT, would arise
from any tendency for this definition to morph into
a target that unnecessarily constrained actions—
that did not effectively permit outcomes outside the
range or away from the target under some circum-
 stances. Resisting such a tendency would be difficult,
I think, once the number was given. And the pres-
sure to elevate price stability over economic stability,
even in the short-term, would be accentuated
because the latter goal would not have a numerical
value. However, ways of mitigating this tendency
might be found—for example, by giving a fairly
wide range and making it clear that the midpoint
had no special meaning and that the edges were
soft. Critical to maintaining useful flexibility would
be the understanding, believability, and sustainabil-
ity of the “provisos” that the Federal Reserve would
give outlining the circumstances under which it
would not seek to achieve its price stability objective. 
STRESS-TESTING MY SKEPTICISM—
WOULD INFLATION TARGETING 
HAVE IMPROVED ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE IN RECENT YEARS?
1. Would IT have contributed in any way to
damping the boom and bust since the mid-1990s?
I have already voiced my opinion that it would not
have helped and might even have hurt in the reac-
tion to emerging weakness in 2001. But another
part of the question is, Would IT have constrained
the previous upswing in a way that also would have
lessened the subsequent weakening? 
A number of observers believe that a little more
policy tightening a little earlier might have damped
the fluctuations in financial markets and the econ-
omy. Personally, I doubt that, given the strong forces
at work. But I also do not think an IT framework
would have helped, even if such an outcome were
possible. Inflation was edging lower through much
of this period. To be sure, forecasts were consistently
missing on the high side, so a forecast-based IT
framework might have run a slightly tighter policy—
but I do not think you want to rest a case for chang-
ing policy regimes on persistent forecast misses.
The arguments usually given for tighter Federal
Reserve policy in the mid-to-late 1990s reference
developments in asset prices—specifically in the
equity market—and the judgment that too-low inter-
est rates fostered an intertemporal misallocation of
resources in the form of an excessive buildup of
capital and, hence, raised the amplitude of longer-
term economic fluctuations. IT is especially poorly
adapted to deal with these sorts of issues, however,
since it tends to emphasize the performance of
inflation in consumer goods and services over the
succeeding few years. For those, like me, who are
skeptical about the ability of central banks to deal
with swings in asset prices or with longer-term
resource allocation issues, this aspect of IT is not
negative. Nonetheless, it is also evident in speeches
and commentary that policymakers in IT countries
right now are wrestling with the tension between
IT frameworks and the suspicion that economic
imbalances and disequilibriums in house or other
asset prices are developing that could disrupt the
economy at some point down the road. 
2. Would ongoing IT or even a numerical defini-
tion of price stability have damped the bond market
volatility of this spring and summer?
Long-term interest rates fell steeply in May and
early June and rebounded even more sharply in late
June and July. The decline got under way in earnest
after the FOMC statement of May 6. What was the
news that day? First, the FOMC thought that inflation
could be below a level consistent with satisfactory
economic performance over time and that the cur-
rent rate of inflation was close to that excessively
low level. Second, the FOMC was worried that the
lower limit would be breached—it thought inflation
was more likely headed down than headed up from
the already low level. In response, 10-year Treasury
rates fell 8 basis points the day of the announcement
and another 12 basis points the next day as the
import of the announcement sank in.
In my view, most of this immediate 20-basis-
point decline in longer-term rates came not in
response to the clarification of the inflation objec-
tive but rather to the revelation that the FOMC was
worried about the trend of inflation. Moreover, much
of the information on the latter point was quite
recent, reflecting what seemed to be a lack of a
rebound in the economy after the Iraq war and a
steep decline in recent inflation readings. In these
circumstances, had we had an inflation target for a
while, rates might have been lower before the
announcement, but most of that decline would have
filtered into the markets only over the preceding
few weeks and rates would have been just as low a
few days after the meeting.
The next 70 basis points of rate decline occurred
by mid-June in response to further indications of
weakness in activity and prices and to statements
by Federal Reserve officials that they were thinking
about how to conduct policy in the remote contin-
gency that a deflation threatened to take hold. I do
not see how this response would have been differ-
ent in an IT framework. My judgment in this regard
is reinforced by the fact that rates in many IT coun-
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tries over this same period of May and June fell by
a similar magnitude. Weakness in the world’s most
important economy and declines in its exchange
rate should lead rates overseas to decline, but the
extent and similarity of the decline is surprising.
This occurrence has led me to conclude that the
rate drop in the United States was caused by the
downward shocks to expected prices and activity,
not by the policy framework.
The IT countries did experience somewhat
smaller rate increases relative to the United States
in July and August. They did not have some of the
special factors pushing U.S. rates up—revised expec-
tations about bond purchases and mortgage hedging
activity. Perhaps more importantly, their economies,
though strengthening, did not demonstrate the sur-
prising degree of rebound that seems to be occurring
in the United States.
In sum, this is a striking episode in which mis-
understandings between the central bank and the
markets probably contributed to an extraordinary
volatility in financial markets. But these misunder-
standings did not stem from the absence of inflation
targets in the United States; volatility would have
been damped only a little, if at all, under IT. 
CONCLUSION
I recognize that I am at risk of being interpreted
as saying that something good—the policy regime
of the past 20 years—cannot be made better or that
there are not downside risks to highly judgmental,
flexible policy with an imprecise price stability
objective. That is not what I think. I am open to
alternatives that promise improvements or that
raise the odds on good policy continuing in the
future without incurring much in the way of current
costs. But I do believe that those who propose
changes from a good system have a high burden of
proof. The marginal benefits from improving a good
regime, by definition, are not likely to be high. And
any change must deal with the uncertainties created
by the law of unintended consequences. I have yet
to be convinced that for the United States inflation
targeting has jumped those hurdles.
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